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The Role of the Economic, 
Technological, and 
Demographic Environments
THE IMPORTANCE OF BARGAINING POWER
This chapter examines how various forces in the environment influence labor 
relations in emerging countries. We focus in particular on how factors in the 
economic, technological, and demographic environments influence the bar­
gaining power of both labor and management. In doing so we are moving 
downward in our three-tiered framework by examining how external envi­
ronmental factors influence the functional level of labor relations.
Bargaining power is a central concept in labor relations because it is the key 
determinant of bargaining outcomes related to wages and other work condi­
tions. The influence of power is most evident in settings where employees are 
represented by unions because unions exercise their power through the for­
mal mechanism of negotiations. And where there are negotiations, as we will 
discuss, there is always the threat of strike action (or strike-like actions) 
whether or not strikes are legal. The legality of strikes varies across countries 
and often also across different types of employees and employment relation­
ships. A union will be better able to gain a high wage and other favorable 
contract terms when it has relatively high bargaining power. Often something 
in the environment determines whether a union has a lot of bargaining power 
in one situation and little power in another. Thus, we start this chapter with a 
discussion of how the environment influences bargaining power and the bar­
gaining process. The text will show how a low unemployment rate (an aspect 
of the economic environment), for example, strengthens workers’ ability to 
hold out when they are on strike and thereby gives a union greater bargaining 
power.
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An examination of bargaining power in unionized settings will also clarify 
what factors determine wages and working conditions where employees are 
not represented by unions and even where the employment relationship is 
not formally structured. (As discussed in chapter 6, unstructured employment 
relationships exist in what are labeled informal employment systems.) Even in 
the absence of unions and collective negotiations, some types and sources of 
bargaining power exist.
Ä CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING THE ENVIRONMENT
This book uses as a framework an extension of the model proposed by John 
Dunlop. Dunlop theorized that three main influences shape the labor rela­
tions environment: (1) the economic context, (2) the technological con­
text, and (3) the locus o f power in the larger society.1 This book also 
considers the influence of the demographic context. The underlying theme 
is that labor and management can influence the environment and that the 
environment also influences them.
The external environment both incentivizes and constrains labor and man­
agement in their efforts to meet their goals. Thus, it is important to consider 
how the environment shapes the power of both parties. The parties involved 
in the employment relationship also seek to mold their environment to better 
serve their needs. Thus, environmental influences are not entirely outside hu­
man control.
For example, in recent years many employers have created global supply 
chains that typically involve increased outsourcing of production and use la­
bor in a variety of countries and regions. They do so in large part to take ad­
vantage of a more favorable economic environment (such as lower labor costs 
or greater availability of resources). Many firms also have expanded interna­
tionally by investing abroad, forming partnerships with suppliers, or entering 
other types of joint ventures. These firms have directly shaped the economic 
environment for their labor relations.
The ability of the parties involved to influence their environment is 
even more pronounced in the case of public policy because both labor 
and management work to influence the public policies that regulate their own 
behaviors. Thus, in the long run, the environment is to some extent in­
fluenced by the both parties involved in employment relationships. Only in 
the short run should the environment be viewed as external and relatively 
fixed.
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BARGAINING POWER DEFINED
The environment is particularly influential through the effects it exerts on the 
bargaining power of labor and management. Three aspects of bargaining 
power come into play: the total power, the relative power, and the political 
power of both labor and management. Total power concerns the total prof­
its that are available to labor and management. The greater the total power is, 
the more profit is available for labor and management to divide up. Both la­
bor and management prefer situations with greater total power. Relative 
power has to do with the relative strength of labor and management; in other 
words, the ability of either side to gain a larger share of a given amount of 
profit. Here the interests of labor and management conflict. Political power 
concerns the ability of labor or management to influence government 
actions—either the public policies governments adopt that influence labor 
relations or the actions governments take as an employer.
Determinants of the Total Power 
of Labor and Management
The total power of management is heavily influenced by two factors—the 
degree of competition the employer faces and the state of the economy. The 
degree of competition means the amount of competition the employer faces 
from both domestic and international competitors. Firms that face few com­
petitors and thereby have market power earn greater profits and thus have 
more resources for labor and management to divide up. In the most concen­
trated industries, a firm can become a monopoly and earn monopoly profits. 
In this case the total power of labor and management is at its maximum and 
bargaining is made easier by the fact that both high wages and high profits can 
be funded from the firm’s monopoly profits.
The state of the economy influences total power by affecting the level of 
demand (i.e., sales) and profits. The interests of labor and management with 
regard to total power are similar as both sides prefer less competition and a 
strong economy.
Determinants of the Relative Bargaining 
Power of Labor and Management
The relative bargaining power a union has is heavily influenced by the ability 
of the union and its members to withdraw their labor, usually (though not 
always) through a strike. Workers are more likely to win higher wages and 
other gains when they are willing and able to sustain a strike. Moreover, 
strikes are more likely to succeed if the cost of the strike to the employer is
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significant. Thus, the employer’s relative bargaining power is heavily influ­
enced by his or her ability to withstand a strike. The simplest measure of rela­
tive bargaining power is the amount of strike leverage each party holds.
Workers can also withdraw their labor through more informal actions, 
such as working to rule (following rules strictly rather than pursuing effective 
work practices), enacting a strategy called the “blue flu” (large-scale worker 
absenteeism), and other means of slowing production. The discussion that 
follows focuses on the effects of strikes that involve workers who fully with­
draw their labor. However, many of the points raised carry over to less ex­
treme forms of labor withdrawal.
How Strike Leverage Influences Relative Bargaining Power The relative 
degree to which workers and the employer are willing and able to sustain a 
strike is their strike leverage. To measure each party’s strike leverage, one 
needs to know what costs a strike would impose on each party and what al­
ternative income sources are available to each party to offset any income losses 
induced by a strike. The discussions of the environmental contexts that follow 
help us understand what determines strike leverage.
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Economic factors significantly influence both total and relative bargaining 
power. Economic factors can be separated into those that operate at the mac­
rolevel (economy-wide) and those that operate at the microlevel (relevant 
only to a specific bargaining relationship).
Microeconomic Influences on Total Bargaining Power
Microeconomic factors influence the total bargaining power of a particular 
employer or union through the effects of competitive conditions on a firm. 
The greater the market power of a firm (i.e., the less competition it faces in 
the markets in which it competes) the greater will be its profits. With greater 
profits, there are more resources for the parties to divide based on their rela­
tive power. A firm’s market power is affected by the degree of domestic and 
international competition it faces. With regard to total bargaining power, la­
bor and management have common interests; both sides prefer that the firm 
have market power. (This is true if other factors are held constant, especially 
factors that affect the relative power of labor and management.) The existence 
of these potential common interests explains why unions sometimes join with 
the management of a firm to push for government regulations that enhance 
the market power of the firm. For example, frequently unions representing
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steel workers join with steel companies to lobby their national government to 
restrict the importation of foreign steel and impose higher tariffs on those 
imports.
Microeconomic Influences on Relative 
Bargaining Power
Microeconomic factors influence the relative bargaining power of labor and 
management through effects on the strike leverage of the parties and the elas­
ticity of demand for labor (the wage-employment trade-off).
Management's Strike Leverage The more an employer is willing and able 
to sustain a strike, the more likely the work force will be to settle a strike be­
fore achieving all of the union’s goals. The strike leverage of employees de­
rives from the strike’s influence on firm profits. The greater the profits lost by 
the firm, the more ready the firm will be to give in to labor’s demands. Dur­
ing a strike, a firm’s profits are, in turn, shaped by the strike’s effects on pro­
duction and sales. Figure 4.1 diagrams the principal determinants of an 
employer’s strike leverage. These include the ability to of workers to harm 
production, sales, and profits and the ability of management to find alternative 
means to maintain production, sales, and profits.
The effects of a strike on production: Once a strike has begun, the first indicator 
of workers’ bargaining power is the degree to which the strike has impaired 
production and/or service. Workers who succeed in actually halting produc­
tion because there are no readily available labor substitutes—supervisors, 
employees from another plant, strikebreakers, or automated equipment— 
have substantial strike leverage and bargaining power. In other words, these
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workers are essential to the production process. Craft workers, who are typi­
cally very difficult to replace because of their skills, often have significant 
strike leverage. For example, the high skill levels of electricians and repair 
machinists help explain why they earn so much more than production work­
ers in the auto, steel, and textile industries.
The effects of a strike on sales: The power of a striking work group is tem­
pered, however, if the halt in production does not lead to a reduction in sales. 
Employers can sever or at least weaken the link between production and sales 
if inventories are high or if alternative production sites can be used to produce 
what normally would be produced at the site where the strike is taking place. 
Whether alternative production is available is influenced by the bargaining 
structure (whether other sites are covered by the same union or contract) and 
by the extent to which other workers at other sites join or support the strike.
The effects of a strike on profits: Even if production and sales are stopped by a 
strike, the firm may not necessarily experience a serious decline in profits. For 
example, firms with relatively low ongoing capital or interest expenses will 
have an easier time withstanding a loss of income caused by a strike. Also, 
firms facing a strike that also shuts down all the competitors’ operations have 
an easier time withstanding a strike because sales and profits may be largely 
postponed rather than permanently lost. Firms that have substantial savings or 
alternative income sources (such as from other lines of business) can more eas­
ily absorb the costs of a strike. Later sections of this chapter discuss how the 
recent growth in employers’ nonunion operations has improved their strike 
leverage through this channel.
The Union’s Strike Leverage Consider the other side—the union’s strike 
leverage. A union’s strike leverage is determined by the ability and willingness 
of the work force to stay out on strike. The longer workers are willing and 
able to stay on strike, the greater the bargaining power the union has and the 
more likely it is to win favorable employment terms from an employer, other 
factors being constant.
Alternative sources of worker income: Workers’ willingness to stay out on strike 
is heavily influenced by the degree to which alternative sources of income are 
available to them. Obviously, workers in unions that offer ample strike ben­
efits can afford to stay out on strike longer than those in other unions. Like­
wise, when striking workers can more readily find temporary or part-time 
work that supplements union strike benefits or when they have substantial 
savings or assets, they are more able to sustain a strike action.
Worker solidarity: Another factor that influences workers’ strike leverage be­
yond the microeconomic environment is the attitude of union members.
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Workers’ feelings of solidarity with one another influence whether picket 
lines will be honored, and any pent-up frustrations will influence workers’ 
willingness to stay out on strike. In brief, strikes are highly emotional under­
takings and they depend on numerous factors, not simply the microeconomic 
environment.
The Wage-Employment Trade-Off
Strike leverage determines whether workers are able to press for a higher 
wage settlement or other contractual provisions. But higher wages often bring 
cuts in employment, and thus unions may in some cases choose not to 
raise wages as much as they could. This is called the wage-employment 
trade-ofF.
The key point is that wage increases can bring employment effects as well 
as direct wage gains. Unions sometimes moderate their wage demands be­
cause of employment effects. For example, management often threatens 
unionized apparel workers with the claim that if they succeed at pushing 
wages significantly higher, the company will shift its production to other 
countries. In recognition of this threat, apparel unions in various countries 
have at times moderated their wage demands. This trade-off between wages 
and employment is thus another important microeconomic influence on bar­
gaining power and outcomes.
Marshall's Four Basic Conditions and How Each Affects the Wage-Employ­
ment Trade-Off Unions are more likely to consider the employment effects 
that result from a wage increase when these effects are greater. Why a wage 
increase leads to large reductions in employment in one situation and to small 
reductions in another situation is explained by Marshall’s conditions. In his 
seminal analysis of the relative bargaining power of labor and management, 
Alfred Marshall argued that unions are most powerful when the demand for 
labor is highly inelastic—that is, when increases in wages will not result in 
significant reductions in employment in the unionized sector.2 Marshall fur­
ther proposed four basic conditions under which the demand for union labor 
would be inelastic: (1) when labor cannot be easily replaced in the production 
process by other workers or machines; (2) when the demand for the final 
product is price inelastic (that is, demand is not sensitive to changes in the 
price of the product); (3) when the supply of nonlabor factors of production 
is price inelastic; and (4) when the ratio of labor costs to total costs is small.3 
Below we address each of these conditions in turn.
The difficulty of replacing workers: The first condition, the degree to which 
workers are difficult to replace, depends on the production technology. The more
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difficult it is to replace workers with machines or other workers, the less apt 
the workers will be to fear that they will be displaced.
Unions can try to limit the ease with which management can introduce 
new technology by raising the cost of substituting other factors of production 
for union labor, but that strategy presents a dilemma. Collectively bargained 
constraints on technological change may keep unions from losing jobs, but 
slowing that rate of technological change may also constrain the rate of pro­
ductivity growth, limiting the long-run potential for wage increases.
The demand for the product: Workers face less of an employment decline 
from raising wages if the demand for the product produced by these workers 
is not sensitive to the price of the product. This sensitivity (what economists 
call the elasticity of product demand) is a second key condition Marshall identi­
fied. This condition is somewhat different from the other three in that it is 
influenced by consumer preferences and not by the actions of the firm or the 
union. The elasticity of product demand depends on the willingness of con­
sumers to substitute other products.
A modern-day illustration of this principle is the threat to union power 
raised by less expensive foreign imports that become more attractive to do­
mestic consumers as wages and prices in the unionized domestic economy 
rise. The lower prices of goods produced in the auto, apparel, steel, and elec­
trical appliance industries in many emerging countries have put pressure on 
producers in more industrialized countries and thereby illustrate this aspect of 
Marshall’s conditions. Many unions try to influence consumer actions through 
“Buy Union” campaigns and counteract the pressure of lower priced goods.
The supply of other inputs: Marshall’s third condition is the responsiveness of 
the price of other inputs in the production process to the demand for those 
inputs (what economists call the elasticity of supply of other factors of production). 
When an employer turns to alternative inputs such as machines or other fac­
tors of production in order to economize on the cost of labor, unions will be 
more able to push up wages (with less fear of employment cutbacks) if the 
price of those other inputs increases as their use increases. Thus, the more 
inelastic the supply curve for alternative inputs is, the greater is union power. 
Whereas Marshall’s first condition concerns the degree to which it is techno­
logically feasible to substitute other factors of production for unionized labor, 
his third condition concerns the costs to the firm of increasing its use of alter­
native factors.
Labor s share of total costs: Marshall’s fourth condition is that unions are more 
powerful when labor costs represent only a small proportion of total costs. 
This condition has often been restated as “the importance of being unim­
portant.” An employer is less likely to resist union pressure if a given wage
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increase affects only a very small proportion of the total cost of the product. 
Thus, a small craft unit, such as the skilled maintenance employees in a plant, 
is often less likely to meet management resistance to its wage demands than 
would a broad bargaining unit that represents all production and maintenance 
employees.4
Bargaining in the public sector illustrates the difficulties unions experience 
when labor costs represent a large proportion of total production costs. Labor 
costs for governments often run between 60 and 70 percent of the budget, 
and for some occupations such as firefighters these costs run as high as 90 per­
cent of the budget. When government officials seek to control total budget 
costs, they take a very hard line in collective negotiations because the wages 
and salaries of public employees represent their largest controllable cost.
All of Marshall’s conditions are based on the assumption that workers and 
unions are concerned about the employment effects of wage increases. If 
union members are willing to accept a slow rate of growth in employment or 
a decline in the number of union jobs as a trade-off for higher wages, the 
sources of power discussed above are less important. The extent to which 
unions factor in the wage-employment trade-off in their negotiations depends 
on factors such as the political dynamics in the respective union and whether 
or not macroeconomic conditions provide good alternatives in the labor mar­
ket. If favorable labor market alternatives prevail (i.e., a low unemployment 
rate and strong economic growth), then workers and their union are likely to 
be less concerned with potential employment reductions that would follow 
wage increases in a particular negotiation.
Macroeconomic Influences on Total and 
Relative Bargaining Power
Economists refer to unemployment and the growth in national productivity 
as macroeconomic factors. The overall state of the economy affects bargaining 
power through a variety of channels. A firm is likely to be earning higher 
profits (greater total power) when the economy is strong and demand is 
growing.
A union’s strike leverage depends in part on the availability of jobs, for 
both the striking workers and their spouses or other family members who 
might help support the strikers. The higher the unemployment rate, the less 
likely it is that striking workers or family members will be to find substitute 
employment and the more likely it is that other family wage earners will be 
out of work. Thus, unions generally gain strike leverage during the upswing 
of a business cycle, when the unemployment rate declines. Conversely, the 
relative power of unions declines during periods of rising unemployment.
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The factors at work here include those discussed earlier regarding striking 
workers’ needs for alternative income sources and employers’ vulnerability to 
strikes when product demand is high. During periods of slack demand em­
ployers may, in fact, welcome a strike because they can lower their invento­
ries during the strike and use the strike as a substitute for layoffs.
POLITICAL POWER
The power of labor and management is influenced by their respective politi­
cal power through a variety of channels. As mentioned above, one example of 
how politics matters is through the influence of public policies on the macro- 
economic policies that affect the total and relative power of labor and man­
agement. Yet, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the legal system and a number 
of public policies significantly shape labor relations. So the political power of 
labor and management matters because that power influences the laws and 
public policies that regulate labor relations. In many emerging countries, pub­
lic policies also directly affect government regulation of pay and social welfare 
policies, such as pensions, vacations, and health care. This provides another 
channel through which political power affects the bargaining power of labor 
and management. In addition, as will be discussed more fully in chapter 10, in 
emerging countries governments are often significant employers. Political 
power thus also influences employment terms and conditions through its ef­
fects on the role governments play as an employer.
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The power and influence that labor, management, governments, and other 
actors have in labor relations is shaped by the economic environment in 
which those parties operate. In the sections that follow in this chapter, we 
examine the key components of the economic environment in emerging 
countries, including the role of demographic factors such as population and 
urbanization trends, child labor, and educational attainment.
Size and Quality of the Labor Force
A key factor that will affect a country’s labor relations system is the size of the 
work force. Economists point out that a larger work force can contribute to 
economic growth in the long run by increasing the supply of labor. At the 
same time, an increase in the supply of labor can lead to downward pressures 
on wages in the short run because it often takes time for the effects of an in­
crease in the labor supply to produce economic growth and the increases in 
the demand for labor that lead to wage growth over the longer term.
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The supply of labor, which has both quantity and quality dimensions, is the 
key determinant of the size of the work force. The quantity of labor in the 
labor market is influenced by the size of the working population, by the ex­
tent of rural-to-urban migration (which is commonly linked to a shift away 
from farm work), and by the amount of child labor. The quality of labor is 
influenced by the educational attainment of the work force. We discuss each 
of these key components below and highlight several policy issues related to 
labor supply that have recently surfaced in emerging countries, such as the 
discrimination urban migrants face and the labor market difficulties college 
graduates face.
Population Trends
In many emerging countries, the rate of population growth is faster than in 
most advanced industrialized countries, and this has contributed to growth in 
the labor forces of those countries. More than three-quarters of the world’s 
people now live in emerging countries
The average life span remains about twelve years greater in the advanced 
industrialized countries as compared to emerging countries, although this gap 
has been sharply reduced in recent decades. In 1950, life expectancy at birth 
for people in emerging countries averaged 35 to 40 years, compared with 62 
to 65 years in advanced industrialized countries. However, average life expec­
tancy has been increasing in many emerging countries. In East Asia and Latin 
America, for example, life expectancies are now an impressive 74 and 73 
years, respectively.
Because of high birth rates, populations are relatively youthful in emerging 
countries. Children under the age of 15 constitute more than 30 percent of 
the total population of emerging countries, but this group constitutes just 17 
percent of the total population in advanced industrialized countries. In fact, in 
at least ten emerging countries, children under the age of 15 constitute over 
44 percent of the total population. As a result, the work force in emerging 
countries must support almost twice as many children as it does in advanced 
industrialized countries.
Urbanization and Migration Trends
Generally, the more economically advanced the country, measured by per 
capita income, the greater the share of population living in urban areas. While 
individual countries become more urbanized as they develop, it is also the 
case that today’s poorest countries are far more urbanized than the advanced 
industrialized countries were when they were at a comparable level of devel­
opment, and on average emerging countries are urbanizing at a faster rate 
than em erpincr co u n tries  d id  in  th e  nasf
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One of the most significant modern demographic phenomena is the rapid 
growth of cities in emerging countries. The most rapid urbanization is now 
occurring in Asia and Africa. It is forecast that before 2030, more than half  of 
all people in these regions will live in urban areas.5
A key source of the significant urban population growth in emerging coun­
tries is large-scale rural-to-urban migration. This migration has led to high 
rates of unemployment, as rates of rural-to-urban migration in emerging 
countries have exceeded rates of urban job creation and have strained urban 
social services. Another problem caused by these high rates of migration is 
that a high proportion of well-educated young people make up the migrant 
population and this depletes the rural countryside of skilled workers.
Rural-to-Urban Migration in China In China, migration of former farm 
peasants into urban areas has greatly increased the size of the work force in 
industrial enterprises in urban areas in recent years. This sort of migration was 
highly restricted before market reforms were introduced in China in the 
1980s. Under the hukou system, individuals were required to be registered 
with the local authority where they were born and lived. Rural residents 
were not allowed to move to urban areas for employment. Although this re­
striction has gradually been eased during the reform era, rural migrants con­
tinue to suffer severe discrimination when they seek employment, legal 
protections, or public benefits in an urban area (see box 4.1).
BOX 4.1
The Hukou Registration System in China
The number of Chinese workers moving from rural areas to large cities 
is large and increasing. In 2012, there were 262 million migrant work­
ers in China (a 3.9 percent increase from 2011). O f these, 163 million 
had left their home province to work in other provinces.
When the Communist Party came to power in 1949, the govern­
ment made restrictions on migration to urban areas to ensure that 
enough people were working in rural areas. In 1958, the government 
placed stricter control on internal migration of workers through a per­
manent registration process called the hukou system, a series of mea­
sures to prevent citizens seeking higher living standards from moving to 
cities without permission.
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Under the hukou system, the social benefits a person receives are tied 
to where he or she was born. The rigidity of the hukou system makes it 
nearly impossible for internal migrant families to reap the benefits of 
urban life. Without an official hukou (household registration record), a 
migrant worker’s family is denied access to a range of city services, in­
cluding medical care, pensions, government services, and education. 
The strict registration system deprives families of the supports they need 
to live. After the hukou system was made stricter in the 1950s, police 
began periodically enforcing the law by placing those who did not have 
legitimate registered permits in detention centers. Migrant workers 
without legal documentation were expelled from the city.
A large number of activist youths were relocated to rural areas during 
the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s as punishment for their 
political activism. The government of China eventually permitted the 
young revolutionists to return to cities.
With the advent of increased technology it has been easier for police 
to enforce the hukou system using a national database of official hukou 
registrations. The denial of benefits to some migrant families in cities 
creates a major division between permanent residents and migrants. Mi­
grant workers in cities are stigmatized and discriminated against. Mi­
grant workers are restricted from access to public services, and they are 
often blamed for urban crime and unemployment.
Migrant workers also face discrimination from permanent residents 
who speak to them in public as if they are children. The workers are 
often banned from entering expensive restaurants and hotel lobbies. 
Adding to the discrimination, the Chinese word for these migrant work­
ers, notigmin, refers an inferior educational and cultural status and infe­
rior economic competencies.
In the last five years Chinese authorities have made some efforts to 
make it less difficult for migrant workers to move their hukou to the cit­
ies where they work. They are also trying to provide services in cities to 
all permanent residents. At the same time, the trend toward internal 
migration in China does not seem to be decelerating. Migrant workers 
now constitute about 20 percent of China’s total population. It is ex­
pected that in the next several years, an additional 100 million more 
rural residents will migrate to cities.
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
was40/gjtjj_en_detail.jsp?searchword=migrants&channelid:=9528&record=3;
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Bob Davis and Tom Orlik, “China Seeks to Give Migrants Perks of City Life,” 
Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424 
127887324178904578341801930539778.html?cb=loggedO. 397257373901.0 
8407; Hsiao-Hung Pai, “China’s Rural Migrant Workers Deserve More Re­
spect from the City Dwellers,” The Guardian, August 25, 2012, http://w w w  
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/25/china-rural-migrants-more 
-respect; PR I’s The World, “China’s Hukou System Puts Migrant Workers at 
Severe Economic Disadvantage,” May 1, 2013, http://www.pri.org/stories/ 
politics-society/social-justice/china-s-hukou-system-puts-migrant-workers-at 
-severe-economic-disadvantage-13676.html; Wu Zhong, “How the Hukou 
System Distorts Reality,” Asia Times, April 11, 2007, http://www.atim es. 
com/atimes/China/IDl 1 Ad01 .html.
The difficult economic and social conditions migrants face has emerged 
as a key public policy issue in a number of countries, not just in China. 
Box 4.2 highlights the problems migrants face in Singapore and the protests 
that are surfacing as migrants there seek improvements in their work lives 
and status.
BOX 4.2
Frustrations Surface in the Ranks o f  
Singapore’s Migrant Workers
Frustration among Singapore’s unappreciated and underpaid migrant 
workers has been building in recent years as their numbers have grown 
faster than the country can accommodate them. Tensions boiled over 
earlier this month, after a 33-year-old Indian migrant worker was killed 
by a bus in the Little India neighborhood. A crowd of fellow workers 
from South Asia gathered at the scene. Their anger quickly escalated, 
with some 400 people pelting stones, attacking emergency responders 
and setting fire to vehicles. It was the worst riot to hit Singapore, one of 
the world’s most orderly countries, since 1969... .
Migrant laborers are paid as little as 2 Singapore dollars, or $1.60, 
per hour. Few speak fluent English, the country’s working language, 
and most live in crowded dormitories away from residential areas. 
They typically are at the mercy of employers, owe high debt to hiring 
agents and have few means of expressing grievances. Last year, 200
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Bangladeshi workers protested unpaid wages and Chinese bus drivers 
refused to report to work to protest salaries lower than their Singapor­
ean and Malay counterparts.
Source: Reprinted from New York Times Editorial Board, “Singapore’s Angry 
Migrant Workers,” New York Times, December 27, 2013.
Educational Attainment
The education levels of workers are an important factor in labor relations. 
Educational systems vary from country to country. There are differences in 
the age when students typically begin and end each phase of schooling, the 
duration of courses taken, and what students are taught and expected to learn. 
These differences make it extremely complicated to draw international com­
parisons based on education.6
There have been dramatic improvements in education throughout the 
world. Today, 82 percent of all people are literate, compared to 63 percent as 
recently as 1970. Since 1950, there have been significant reductions in educa­
tion inequality based on gender in emerging countries, although the need for 
further progress remains, as two-thirds of the world’s illiterate people are 
women.
At the same time, education levels in emerging countries continue to seri­
ously lag behind levels in advanced industrialized countries. For example, in 
Europe, North America, or Japan, children can expect to receive more than 
twelve years of schooling. The average child in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, in contrast, can expect to spend less than five years in school.
Since 1950, the average years of schooling among the total population 15 
years and older in emerging countries has increased significantly, from 2.1 
years to 7.1 years. In South Asia and the Middle East/North Africa regions, 
average years of schooling have more than doubled since the 1980s. The im­
provements in completion and enrollment ratios at all levels among the 
younger cohorts in every generation contribute to a continual increase in the 
average years of schooling as these cohorts mature over time. The biggest 
improvement in average years of schooling among the younger cohorts was 
recorded during the period 1970 and 1990 in both emerging and advanced 
industrialized countries.
The more rapid the rate of population growth, the greater the proportion 
of dependent children in the total population and the more difficult it is for 
people who are working to support those who are not.
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A key fact is that while emerging countries contain more than 80 percent 
of the world’s population, they account for only half of the world’s popula­
tion that has attained some form of higher education. At the same time, im­
provements in education will not lead to sustained improvements in standards 
of living if there are not adequate jobs that require the higher skills of the bet­
ter educated. Box 4.3 describes recent concerns about a potential oversupply 
of college-educated individuals in China. Similar concerns have appeared in 
other emerging countries recently.
BOX 4.3
The Oversupply o f College Graduates in China
Prior to the 1990s, only the top 4 percent of Chinese students were able 
to attend college and there were plenty of college graduate—level jobs to 
go around. However, in the past few decades, enrollment in public 
universities in China has increased rapidly, which has increased the 
number of students eligible for a college degree. The number of univer­
sity graduates has nearly doubled since 2002. The percentage of col­
lege-age people attending university went from 4 percent to about 20 
percent since 2002. However, this number still lags behind the compa­
rable figures for advanced industrialized countries, where 40 percent or 
more of college-age students are enrolled in universities.
The oversupply of students first emerged in 1999, when Chinese 
authorities initiated policies to increase college enrollment in order to 
prepare young Chinese adults for a twenty-first-century economy. Al­
though China’s economy is growing rapidly, there are not enough jobs 
for the number of university graduates. The total number of graduates 
for the current decade is expected to reach 94 million, which is nearly 
double the graduate rate of the previous decade. Graduates are ex­
tremely disappointed in their quest to find quality work, make good 
money, and live a comfortable lifestyle.
As a result of the lack of jobs, some college graduates are seeking to 
leave China and work abroad. Pressures are building among graduates 
whose skills are not being fully utilized.
Source: Sophie Song, “Future of Chinese Graduates Is Bleak: More Than Half 
Will Have to Take Blue-Collar Jobs by 2020,” International Business Times, 
June 10, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/future-chinese-college-graduates 
-bleak-mo re-half-will-have-take-blue-collar-jobs-2020-1298875.
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Gender Gaps in Education Young females receive less education than 
young males in most emerging countries. The gender gap in education is es­
pecially great in emerging countries in Africa, where female literacy rates can 
be less than half that of men. In most emerging countries, women make up a 
minority of college students.
There are several reasons why closing the educational gender gap by in­
creasing the educational opportunities for women is economically desirable. 
First, the increase in earnings due to education is greater for women than it is 
for men in most emerging countries. Another reason why it is economically 
desirable to close the educational gender gap in emerging countries is that 
increasing women’s education not only increases their productivity in the 
workplace, it also results in greater labor force participation, later marriage, 
lower fertility, and greatly improved child health and nutrition, thus benefit­
ing the next generation as well. Further, because women carry a dispropor­
tionate burden of poverty, any significant improvements in their role and 
status through education can have an important impact on breaking the vi­
cious circle of poverty and inadequate schooling. Studies also show that moth­
ers’ education plays a decisive role in raising levels of nutrition in rural areas.
In summary, while significant improvements have occurred in the level 
and spread of education in emerging countries in recent years, these countries 
still face great challenges as they seek to improve access to education.
Child Labor
Another critical aspect of the economic environment that has particularly 
large effects on labor relations in emerging countries is child labor. The vol­
ume of child labor matters in part because of the effects it has on increasing 
the supply of labor. In addition, child labor nearly always takes place under 
very poor work conditions that include low pay and unsafe work. Child la­
borers are not the only workers affected by these poor conditions; they spread 
and affect other workers at the low end of the labor market.
A comprehensive report on child labor published by the International La­
bour Organization in 2013 documents that 168 million children worldwide 
are laborers; this group accounts for almost 11 percent of the child population 
as a whole.7 Children in hazardous work that directly endangers their health, 
safety, and moral development make up almost half of all child laborers, about 
85 million. Child labor is most common in the agriculture sector, but the ILO 
report shows that the numbers of child laborers in services and industry are by 
no means negligible.
The largest absolute number of child laborers is found in Asia and the 
Pacific region, but sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the region with the
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T a b le  4 .1 . Total number of child laborers and number of child laborers doing hazardous work by 
region, 5—17 age group, 2012
Region
Child laborers
Child laborers doing 
hazardous work
(millions) % (millions) %
Asia and the Pacific 77.7 9.3 33.9 4.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 12.5 8.8 9.6 6.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.0 21.4 28.8 10.4
Middle East and North Africa 9.2 8.4 5.2 4.7
Note: The numbers in the second and fourth columns are the percentages of children as a whole in each 
region.
Source: International Labour Office, Marking Progress against Child Labour: Global Estimates and Trends 2000-2012 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 2013).
highest proportion of child laborers; one in five children are laborers there. As 
shown in table 4.1, for the overall 5—17 age group, child laborers number 
almost 77.7 million in Asia and the Pacific. For the same age group, there 
are 59 million child laborers in sub-Saharan Africa, 12.5 million in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and 9.2 million in the Middle East and North 
Africa.
Not surprisingly, the incidence of child labor is highest in poorer countries. 
Twenty-three percent of children in low-income countries are child laborers, 
compared to 9 percent of children in lower-middle-income countries and 6 
percent of children in upper-middle-income countries.
The agricultural sector is by far the most significant employer of child la­
borers; it employs over 98 million children, 59 percent of the world’s child 
laborers. But the numbers of child laborers in the services and industry sectors 
are by no means negligible. A total of 54 million are found in the services sec­
tor (of which 11.5 million are in domestic work) and 12 million are found in 
industry.
The ILO report also shows that the number of child laborers has declined 
somewhat in recent years. There were almost 78 million fewer child laborers 
at the end of the 2000-2012 period than at the beginning, a reduction of al­
most one-third. The decrease in the number of female child laborers was 
particularly pronounced.
The ILO report identifies a number of actions that have driven progress in 
the reduction of child labor, including the political commitment of govern­
ments to reducing child labor, an increasing number of ratifications of ILO 
conventions, and progressive new public policies in a number of countries. 
The ILO report concludes that “policy choices and accompanying invest­
ments that have been made in two areas appear particularly relevant to the
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decline in child labor over the last 12 years. The first is education. The world­
wide Education For All movement has helped marshal major new invest­
ments in improving school access and quality, which in turn has provided 
more families with the opportunity to send their children to school rather 
than to the workplace and has made it worthwhile for them to do so. It is not 
chance that the rapid decline in child labor since 2000 coincided with a major 
increase in school attendance.”8
The second policy area is social protection. While extending access to so­
cial security remains a pressing challenge globally, there is clear evidence from 
multiple countries that investments in social security are associated with lower 
levels of child labor. This is not coincidental: social security can be essential in 
mitigating the social and economic vulnerabilities that can lead families to 
resort to child labor. Many countries also have recently been taking action to 
establish or revise their lists of what constitutes hazardous work and are in­
cluding prohibitions of these kinds of work for anyone under 18 years of age 
as part of enforceable legislation.9
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Technological change had a major role in workers’ early efforts to use unions 
and other means to improve their employment conditions. It also is clear that 
across the globe ongoing technological changes will have huge effects on fu­
ture employment conditions. Yet many people still disagree over how and 
why technology influenced labor-management relationships and what current 
technological changes imply for the future of labor relations.
The Historical Debate over the Influence of Technology:
Commons versus Marx
Both Karl Marx and John R. Commons believed that workers were spurred 
to join unions by technological change, the shift from craft systems of produc­
tion to wage labor, and the rise of the modern factory system. But they dis­
agreed sharply over exactly why changes in technology and the organization 
of work had that effect.
For Marx, the critical event in industrialization was the chasm that capitalist 
methods of production opened between workers and the owners of the means 
of production. That chasm, according to Marx, would inevitably result in a 
worsening of working conditions, a profit crisis, and the emergence of a revo­
lutionary class consciousness among workers. Followers of Marx went on to 
argue that it was the loss of control that workers experienced as a result of 
shifts in production methods and ownership that led them to form unions. To
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those observers, collective negotiations was (and is) a continuing battle be­
tween workers and managers over control of the production process. Harry 
Braverman built on this argument and claimed that technological change typ­
ically leads to a lowering of the skills required in jobs (deskilling) as part of 
this battle for control.10
Commons, on the other hand, observed that the shift in production meth­
ods was a product of an expansion of the market brought about by urbaniza­
tion and new transportation methods. To Commons, as the market expanded 
and the ownership of production changed, workers encountered a host 
of competitive menaces such as prison labor and child labor. Workers 
then turned to unions to protect themselves and improve their standard of 
living. Commons and his students argued that unions and workers sought 
income and job security rather than control of the production process.11 
Thus, although Marx and Commons differed sharply over the interpreta­
tion of unions’ objectives, both saw the rise of capitalism as the spur to 
unionization.
To Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers, it 
was the process of industrialization and not capitalism per se that brought 
about the changes in the relationship between workers and employers that 
led to unionization.12 They argued that modern technology produced a need 
for rules that would govern relations between workers and employers. Col­
lective negotiations were a logical way to formalize and structure the rules 
required in modern industry. Within this framework, specific technological 
changes are important in collective negotiations because they result in changes 
in the relative bargaining power of management or labor. In this regard, the 
industrialization thesis is closer to the ideas of Commons than to Marx’s 
theories.
The Influence of Microelectronic 
Technology on Skill Levels
The recent growth in the use of microelectronic technology has reignited the 
debate over the effects of technological change. Some believe that this tech­
nology can open the way to less hierarchical, higher skilled work and further 
growth in real incomes. To others, the new technology is being used to wrest 
control away from the work force and to deskill workers.13 These latter ob­
servers see little evidence of a shift away from the hierarchical forms of work 
organization. In fact, these modern proponents of the deskilling thesis argue 
that much of the concessionary negotiations that has occurred in recent years is 
the result of the efforts of managers to increase the pace of work and use new 
technology to weaken workers’ bargaining leverage and skills. Proponents of
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the deskilling thesis also predict that new technology will lead to significant 
employment displacement and unemployment.
A number of behavioral scientists believe that new technologies serve to 
“unfreeze” existing practices and open up a variety of options for reconfigur­
ing the organization of work, career ladders, compensation criteria, and other 
aspects of the employment relationship.14 According to this view, there is no 
single effect of technology on skills or workers’ power; rather, its effects de­
pend on the choices made by decision makers and the way the new technol­
ogy is implemented.
Sum m ary
This chapter examines how the environment influences labor relations in 
emerging countries. The key issues the chapter addresses are that labor rela­
tions are critically shaped by the bargaining power of labor and management 
and that bargaining power has three key components—total, relative, and 
political power. The environment shapes all three of these sources of power. 
This chapter covers the role of the economic, demographic, and technologi­
cal environments.
Important economic factors include those that operate at the firm level 
(microeconomic influences) and the state of the labor market and the overall 
economy (macroeconomic influences). The economic environment is most 
important through the effects it exerts on the bargaining power of labor and 
management. Bargaining power is heavily influenced by strike leverage and 
the extent to which an increase in wages leads to a decline in employment 
(the wage-employment trade-off).
Major demographic issues include the growth in population and the labor 
force, the extent of rural-to-urban migration, and the educational attainment 
of the work force.
Technology influences employment levels and bargaining leverage. In re­
cent years there has been much debate over how technology is affecting the 
skill levels of workers. On the shop floor, labor relations play an important 
role in shaping how well new technology is implemented.
How well a labor relations system serves the interests of labor, management, 
and society often depends on its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. 
Economic pressures on labor relations systems have grown steadily along with 
globalization and the expansion in international trade. There are also pressures 
from the other key environmental dimensions. To help build a better under­
standing of how labor relations can respond to these environmental challenges, 
the next chapter examines how collective negotiations function.
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Discussion Questions
1. Define bargaining power and strike leverage.
2. Several microeconomic factors play a part in the strike leverage of both 
unions and employers. Briefly describe some of these factors.
3. Describe some policy measures emerging countries have initiated in 
recent years that have contributed to a reduction in child labor.
4. Contrast the positive and negative effects of technology on workers 
and working conditions.
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